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The development of solar energy has been depicted as a paradigmatic break in unsustainable global growth,
largely because it is framed as an innovation with minimal carbon emissions. On the contrary, drawing on
literatures from spatial justice and political ecology, including on authoritarian populism, this article analyzes
the rise and fall of the solar industry and the associated failures of “green industrialization” in Bitterfeld, East
Germany—an area that is characterized by political, economic, and social peripheralization, marginalization,
and the rise of the far right. The development of solar energy, we argue, is merely the latest iteration of an
industrial growth model that is rooted in a similar modernist mode of development. Based on original mixed
methods field research in eastern Germany, it argues that many of the same inequalities that characterize
fossil fuels and “gray” (de)industrialization—undemocratic and unsustainable industrial processes, the
concentration of corporate power and profits, and externalized waste and pollution—are replicated by solar
energy. What is distinct is the fact that such contemporary “green” manufacturing processes appear to
negatively affect a wider and more dispersed range of spatial locations, also denying these locales the benefits
of accumulation, production, and consumption. This unevenness reflects the reconfiguration of global supply
chains over the past thirty years and the nature of green production processes that depend on a wider range
of inputs that invariably produce localized sacrifice zones. We offer a spatial justice framework for solar
energy, zooming in at the manufacturing stage, to explore the multiple sacrifice zones at the different stages
of solar energy. Finally, we highlight the politics of resignation that is the product and foundation of
capitalist realism that serves to dispossess communities around solar energy manufacturing sites in eastern
Germany and might feed into the rise of the populist far right. The article contributes to the emerging
critical literature that analyzes the dark side of renewable energy and, in doing so, reveals the social and
ecological costs of energy transitions that continue to be underresearched yet deserve heightened attention.
Key Words: authoritarian populism, decarbonization, green (de)industrialization, industrial strategy,
peripheralization, renewable energy, solar photovoltaics.
A
round the world, cities, companies, govern-
ments, and households are coming to
embrace solar energy as a core part of a shift
toward “sustainability,” decentralization, community
ownership, and enhanced control over the energy
supply (Allen, Lyons, and Stephens 2019; Brisbois
2019). For some, decentralized renewable energy sup-
ply has even become part of agendas to promote
“energy democracy,” attempts at transforming energy
systems so that they become lower carbon but also
more pluralistic and civic minded (Delina 2018;
Szulecki 2018; van Veelen and van der Horst 2018).
In Africa, Adams and Acheampong (2019) wrote
that “democracy and investment in renewable energy
should be given priority on [the] Africa agenda to
mitigate climate change” (1), with solar energy
offered as a paradigmatic example. In India, Shidore
and Busby (2019) framed solar energy as a vital part
of a pathway to become more energy secure nation-
ally as well as a mechanism to address energy scar-
city and poverty. In Canada, Dolter and Boucher
(2018) discussed solar energy as an instrumental part
of achieving energy justice, following work from
Sovacool and Dworkin (2014) showcasing solar
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energy as part of a policy mix for “global
energy justice.”
This study, however, calls into question whether
solar energy and the objectives of democracy, equity,
and justice always go hand in hand, especially when
one considers upstream aspects such as solar energy
manufacturing in marginalized communities such as
those in eastern Germany. The study renews atten-
tion on the spatial justice implications of so-called
green energy supply chains and the greater recogni-
tion of the increasingly invisible and dispersed
impacts of green industrialization.
It further points to the resignation and disillusion
in response to the failures and contradictions of
green industrialization, embedded in wider antidemo-
cratic and populist responses to deindustrialization,
political marginalization, and lack of agency and
decision-making power on the community level.
This study suggests that political decisions that are
attributed to (“free”) market dynamics can feed into
such responses. It illustrates the “politics of
resentment” (Cramer 2016) that can be triggered by
false green promises and the need to take seriously
the rural–urban divide and the spatial dimensions of
energy (in)justice. Consequently, it calls for greater
democratic control over energy generation, supply,
and demand decisions and more locally grounded
imaginaries and models of energy and economic
(de)growth, especially, but not exclusively, at the
manufacturing stage.
This article examines these themes through the
lens of eastern Germany’s experiment with solar
panel manufacturing during the 2000s in the
Bitterfeld region.1 Based on a mixed-methods
research design involving expert interviews, commu-
nity interviews, and site visits in eastern Germany,
the study finds that the industry collapsed due to
global competitive pressures (leading to job losses
locally). It finds that the benefits of solar itself now
accrue far from social and ecological “sacrifice zones”
(Healy, Stephens, and Malin 2019)—in German
households that use the panels and, primarily, the
(multinational) corporations that accumulate the
profits. This dynamic contrasts with previous waves
of industrial development in the Bitterfeld region
where the lignite coal, chemicals, and photography
industries led to the concentration of both capital
and the legacies of pollution in a much narrower
sphere, with the region at that time serving as
the sacrifice zone for East German industrialization.
The rise and fall of the solar industry thus need to
be read against the background of longer histories
and experiences of rapid regional industrialization
characterized by severe air and soil pollution and
other forms of ecological harm and the even more
rapid deindustrialization that had socially disastrous
consequences. The resignation that follows reflects
what we analyze as “capitalist realism” (Fisher 2009)
or the “politics of resignation” (Benson and Kirsch
2010), which feed into the rise of authoritarian pop-
ulism (Hall et al. 1985).
The article proceeds as follows. We first introduce
our conceptual approach of spatial justice and the
political ecology of renewable energy, with explicit
attention to the links to dispossession, deindustriali-
zation, and the rise of authoritarian populism. We
then explain our case study selection in eastern
Germany and its background before explicating our
mixed-methods research design consisting of original
interviews and site visits supplemented with litera-
ture reviews. Finally, we discuss our core results orga-
nized around the three themes of (1) the emergence
of solar manufacturing; (2) its collapse; and (3) the
resulting disappointment, resignation, and sacrifice.
Conceptual Approach: Spatial Justice,
Authoritarian Populism, and the Political
Ecology of Renewable Energy
Although the processes affecting Bitterfeld in par-
ticular, and renewable energy infrastructures such as
solar photovoltaics (PV) more generally, are com-
plex and multiscalar, the energy geography, energy
justice, authoritarian populism, and political ecology
literatures offer some compelling heuristics through
which to interpret them.
Despite its focus primarily on urban struggles for
contested space, Soja’s (2010) notion of spatial jus-
tice is apt here, because it calls on research to better
recognize how social hierarchies are embedded in
spatial consciousness. For Soja (2010), to understand
the dynamics of an urban area, research must
become aware of the outcomes of spatial injustice
and how injustice manifests itself across economic,
social, and political orders that embed the “unjust
geographies” of a city. Soja (2010) discussed four
methods by which one can challenge spatial injus-
tice, methods that we believe are transferable to low-
carbon technology or sociotechnical infrastructures.
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The first is spatial consciousness, or reimagining the
city (or, in this case, a technology or an industrial
supply chain) not as neutral but instead an active
struggle over resources and thus competing inter-
ests. The second is the ability to change geogra-
phies, to view ourselves as spatial beings with the
ability to shape, influence, and direct future out-
comes. The third is participatory democracy and a
call for more inclusive, representative forms of
decision making that better reflect the interests of
local communities or marginalized groups. The
fourth is sustainability, that cities (and in our case
technologies) orient themselves toward a long-
term holistic sustainability that does not sacrifice
the needs of the future for the needs of the
present, or ecological sustainability at the expense
of economic sufficiency.
We interpret Soja’s (2010) call for more just, con-
tingent, deliberative, and sustainable spatial geogra-
phies as extremely relevant to current debates over
the justness (or unjustness) of renewable energy and,
in particular, solar energy but also to understand
green industrialization. Indeed, various literatures
have confirmed, using different methods of analysis
in distinct geographic places at different parts of the
solar life cycle, how solar energy might not always
promote the underlying goals of community empow-
erment, energy democracy, worker well-being, or
environmental prudence. The pioneering work of
Mulvaney (2013, 2014) demonstrates some of the
occupational hazards facing solar workers and manu-
facturers, especially those exposed to unsafe levels of
cadmium, used in thin-film solar PV designs.
Looking at the siting and land politics of solar
energy parks in India, Yenneti and Day (2015, 2016)
and Yenneti, Day, and Golubchikov (2016) revealed
injustices of process, planning, and misrecognition in
how such facilities are sited regardless of commu-
nity concerns.
At the extreme other downstream end of the solar
life cycle, Cross and Murray (2018) examined the
intricate afterlives of discarded solar panels and their
burgeoning waste flows in Kenya. Salim et al. (2019)
conducted a meta-analysis of hundreds of academic
studies published on the sustainability of solar PV
and noted that many heavy metals embedded within
solar systems are hazardous for workers or the envi-
ronment, especially lead, lithium, tin, and cadmium,
which can pose toxic risks during their manufactur-
ing or disposal. Nevertheless, they cautioned that
“little attention has been paid to the potential envi-
ronmental and human health related impacts associ-
ated with PV systems, if not properly managed at
the end-of-life” (Salim et al. 2019, 540).
In this way, solar energy becomes just another
global commodity, just another node in a network of
global factories and logistic networks contributing to
“friction” (Gregson, Crang, and Antonopoulos
2017), and also interconnecting with waste streams,
global recycling networks, and systems of resource
recovery (Gregson and Crang 2015; Gregson et al.
2015). Many such networks and flows are organized
not by national borders but the permeable bound-
aries of sociotechnical systems, markets, or supply
chains (Kama 2014, 2015; Sovacool et al. 2020).
Within this complex multiscalar system, energy vul-
nerabilities are coproduced with spatial advantage
and therefore embed spatial disadvantage
(Golubchikov and O’Sullivan 2020).
To envision such complexes, we advance in this
study a framework for “embodied energy injustices”
(Healy, Stephens, and Malin 2019) or “whole sys-
tems” and “multiscalar” energy justice (Sovacool
et al. 2019). As the top panel of Figure 1 shows, at
the macrolevel the spatial injustices of solar energy
cut across at least the five scales or life cycle stages
of resource extraction, manufacturing, transport and
assembly, operation and use, and decommissioning
and disposal. The resource extraction stage encom-
passes raw material extraction, mining, and refining
with the displacement, slow violence, and suite of
other socioenvironmental impacts it brings. These
injustices and sacrifice zones are not static—with
changing policy and regulatory environments and
political economies of energy, they can shift geo-
graphically and temporally. The displacement of
solar manufacturing from Germany to areas with
lower environmental safeguards, explored later, illus-
trates one such shift at the manufacturing stage and
the development of deep-sea mining (Childs 2020)
for tellurium and other rare earth elements for high-
performance solar panels demonstrates the move-
ment and generation of new sacrifice zones on the
sea floor.
Manufacturing, which we explore in this study
and which is depicted in the bottom panel of Figure
1, reflects the processing, material cultivation, and
fabrication of solar components at a more local or
community scale. Although manufacturing details
vary based on the type of PV module (thin film,
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Figure 1. A spatial justice framework for solar energy. The top panel shows at the macro or “whole systems” scale, and the bottom panel
shows the micro or “community” scale of manufacturing.
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mono, poly, or multicrystalline, dye-sensitized, quan-
tum dot, etc.), material cultivation encompasses
mining, refining, and purification of all of the silicon
and other required metals and minerals for the cells,
glass, frame, inverters, and other required electronics
(Nugent and Sovacool 2014). Petroleum extraction
for plastics, natural gas extraction used for heating,
and effectively any other material extraction and
processing needed to create the PV module and fin-
ished electronics are also included, as are wiring,
encapsulation, and any other processes by which the
modules and electronics are fabricated and finished
(Nugent and Sovacool 2014). The transportation
and assembly stage involves the transport of panels
and installation along with the balance of the sys-
tem, including mounting structures, cabling and
interconnection components, and inverter. The
operation and use stage, often the most visible, is
where the solar panel is “used” but also maintained,
inclusive of cleaning of the modules and any other
processes that occur while it is in use. Scott and
Smith (2017) showed how solar panels might clash
with arable land and food justice concerns through-
out these stages, triggering resistance informed by
right to landscape claims. The final stage of decom-
missioning and disposal reflects the afterlives of the
product and whether they enter waste flows or are
instead repurposed or recycled. Healy, Stephens, and
Malin (2019) added that across the life cycle of
energy systems, far too much focus examines social
and environmental issues at just one point of this
chain (e.g., environmental impact assessments or
social and environmental impact assessments), oper-
ation, and use consumption, thereby obscuring other
impacts upstream or downstream.
As the bottom panel of Figure 1 illustrates, we
focus on one of these neglected or obscured areas,
that of manufacturing. This focal point allows us to
depict the localized spatial dimensions of energy
(in)justices along the globalized supply chain, and
the promises and failures of green (de)industrializa-
tion. It is here that we see job insecurities, disap-
pointment, the marginalization of communities, and
the loss of hope trigger political responses such as
resentment and possibly authoritarian populism
(Hall et al. 1985; Fraune and Knodt 2018).
Drawing from Fraser (2017), we envision authori-
tarian populism as a response to failures of progres-
sive neoliberalism, leading to the rejection of
neoliberal ideology, corporate globalization, and
financialization and the political establishments
within which these are embedded. Authoritarian
populism often goes hand in hand with the rejection
of austerity and precarious work, liberalization of
trade and globalized supply chains, and political sup-
port for the “new (high-tech) economy” at the cost
of manufacturing. Here, our conceptual framework
points to how this is interlinked with the resignation
following the failure of green industrialization and its
associated false green promises.
Scholarship from the U.S. Rust Belt—the former
manufacturing belt and the oldest and largest indus-
trial area of the United States—shows how resent-
ment following deindustrialization might trigger the
rise of authoritarianism (McQuarrie 2017).
Economic tensions speak to the overall decline of
manufacturing belts and the fall of large industrial
areas that were once centers of prominence and
wealth but are now symbols of urban decay (Sugrue
2005). Such shifts in economic power are frequently
accompanied by job and population losses as well as
significant increases in private debt and a depen-
dence on future imports (Chacko and Jayasuriya
2017). Political responses of crisis management that
often promote austerity, a deepening of social frag-
mentation, and the erosion of social safety nets
might further contribute to distrust in political insti-
tutions and the loss of legitimacy of so-called demo-
cratic capitalism (Streeck 2012; Chacko and
Jayasuriya 2017; Norris and Inglehart 2019).
Places can be viewed as products of the systemic
forces of state and capital (Scott 1998) and expres-
sions of the needs of state and capital—but they are
also shaped by community agency and structures of
feeling, narratives, identities, political subjectivities,
and moral values (McQuarrie 2017). The rise in
populism and turn to authoritarianism is not the
direct result of deindustrialization or the decline of
manufacturing, this scholarship suggests, but a conse-
quence of the erosion of the social and political
institutions that buffered citizens from the effects of
industrial decline, triggering anger and the politics
of grievance and reparation (McQuarrie 2017;
Knuth 2019).
Such resentment might stem from a dislike of the
“elite” and new business ventures seeming to back
them, as well as a distrust that such actors and their
allies will respect community values, allocate resources
fairly, or fully appreciate place-based identities
(Cramer 2016). It also reflects an increasingly
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justified acknowledgment that processes of globaliza-
tion and capitalism have often only increased the
volatility and inequality of local supply chains and
manufacturing clusters connected to it (Bello 2018;
McCarthy 2019). In other words, this shows how
space matters in understanding energy injustices
and authoritarian populism, and we need to
understand lived experiences of social and politi-
cal aspects, not just economic marginalization, to
explain these phenomena.
Our framework helps characterize such shifts in
political and ideological alignment and balance of
forces to explain the more recent rise in nationalist,
protectionist politics that are
resonant with broad-brush appeals to “the people,” in
which candidates are rewarded for “strong man” talk
that pits insiders against outsiders of different colours,
religions and origins; growing concern over the
“mobile poor,” including refugees and migrants whose
presence seems to threaten a shrinking resource base;
appeals for security at the expense of civil liberties; a
concerted push to increase extractive capitalism at all
costs; and, finally, a radical undermining of the state’s
ability to support the full range of citizens, while
utilising state powers to increase surplus for a minority.
(Scoones et al. 2018, 1)
This cultural backlash can be seen in the rise of the
far right and the increasing popularity of right-wing
parties, such as the German Alternative f€ur
Deutschland (Alternative for Germany [AFD]). To
understand how the twofold deindustrialization has
played into these processes in Bitterfeld, where the
AFD has gained more votes than any other political
party, we engage with Fisher’s (2009) conceptualiza-
tion of “capitalist realism,” the lack of imagination
of alternatives, and how this further drives authori-
tarian populism.
As a final step, we need to link our framework
back to the political ecology of solar manufacturing,
or the “greenness” in green (de)industrialization.
The relationship between authoritarianism, popu-
lism, and environmental politics has recently
received increased attention (McCarthy 2019).
Important here is that this relationship often plays
out directly through “tensions between rural and
urban areas” (McCarthy 2019, 302) and in reaction
to the mechanization of labor, globalization of mar-
kets, volatility of resources, and inequalities (Bello
2018; Scoones et al. 2018). Claims to resource
nationalism and resource sovereignty, for instance,
might represent critiques of neoliberal inequality and
structural dispossession (Myadar and Jackson 2019).
These inequalities can be simultaneously economic
and ecological, triggered, for instance, by the out-
sourcing of pollution to rural areas, where resistance
might be less powerful, and labor and rent cheaper.
For example, resource extraction can become an
important mobilizing issue for populism given how
extraction is connected to place-based and class
identities, nationalism, and masculinity (Kojola
2019). Environmental displacement and marginaliza-
tion, and the sense of crisis they bring, can national-
ize and naturalize precarious identities of place, class,
and resources. Huber (2013) introduced the concept
of energy populism to show how the protection of
cheap fossil fuels is understood as standing up for the
people, based on idealized and romanticized imagina-
ries of the past, and tied to white, rural masculinity
and extractive labor (see also Balls and Fischer
2019). Building on this work, Kojola (2019) intro-
duced “extractive populism,” in which “heroic male
miners can provide material resources to secure the
nation against foreign enemies while restoring heter-
onormative middle-class families” (373).
Right-wing politicians and parties support extractive
industries and anti-environmentalism not only because
of its political and economic allure but because it justi-
fies morally the degradation of the environment to
achieve these ends. The “cultural and affective power
of mining and how it provides legitimacy and mobilizes
white and rural people … defending rural livelihoods
and sense of place can motivate support for nationalist,
racist, and capitalist political projects, which demon-
strates the contradictions in moral economies of
resource extraction” (Kojola 2019, 378). Populism
thrives when people feel a sense of crisis, and particu-
larly in “resource-dependent communities that face eco-
nomic depressions and a sense of insecurity created by
boom-and-bust cycles” (Kojola 2019, 378). Thus, envi-
ronmental conditions and calamities become inter-
twined with political, economic, and social tensions
and trends (McCarthy 2019). The climate change
denial and pro-coal attitude of the AFD, for instance,
capitalizes on these tensions, disappointments, and frus-
trations with green industrialization (as we return to in
our case study later). This highlights, once again, the
social nature of ecological conflicts (McCarthy 2019)
and the relationship between ecology, social degrada-
tion, and erosion of democracy that is key to political
ecology (Brock 2020a).
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In addition, Figure 1 indicates that renewable
energy supply chains, adoption processes, and politi-
cal ecology more generally are punctuated by strug-
gle and the creation of sacrifice zones. These themes
buttress a line of emerging work revealing that low-
carbon transitions are locally disruptive processes
(D€utschke and Wesche 2018; Dunlap 2019;
McCauley et al. 2019). They can displace people
from their livelihood; dispossess them of their land
(Baka 2017); or even challenge their heritage, tradi-
tion, and cultural identity, an example here being
the social embeddedness of coal mining in parts of
the United States (Carley, Evans, and Konisky
2018). It depicts, also evident in Figure 1, how par-
ticular sacrifice zones can emerge for particular com-
munities at acute exposure to disruption. Lerner
(2010) noted that sacrifice zones, initially termed to
describe communities at risk from the negative
radioactive side effects of nuclear weapons process-
ing, now denote any community disproportionally
exposed to some sort of elevated hazard or at the
frontline of exposure, such as military bases, heavily
polluted industries, or mines. Holifield and Day
(2017) added that a sacrifice zone can particularly
reflect polluted and degraded areas associated with
new extractive activities such as energy production.
“Energy sacrifice zones” link vulnerable communities
along the “energy continuum” (Hernandez 2015) or
life cycle stages of solar energy. Alongside sacrifice
zones, spatial injustices can create or worsen patterns
of peripheralization (Blowers and Leroy 1994;
Blowers 1999; O’Sullivan, Golubchikov, and
Mehmood 2020), a process of marginalizing particu-
lar communities that tend to be geographically
remote, economically marginal, politically powerless,
culturally defensive, or environmentally degraded. In
essence, peripheralization suggests that noxious
industries and unwanted energy infrastructure will
invariably migrate to communities that lack the
political, social, and economic strength to oppose
them, especially indigenous peoples and communities
of color, often at the extreme social and geographi-
cal periphery of society (Rasmussen 1998; Park and
Sovacool 2018) and often reinforcing environmental
injustices and degrees of environmental racism.
In sum, we position ourselves conceptually within
a political ecology, authoritarian populism, and spa-
tial justice perspective. We seek to unveil how polit-
ical, social, economic, and environmental factors
fuse together to create winners and losers and
worsen some fundamental patterns of exclusion and
inequality across space and time (Peet, Robbins, and
Watts 2011; Brock and Dunlap 2018; Sovacool
2018; Sovacool, Tan-Mullins, and Abrahamse 2018).
The supposed “greenness” and “cleanliness” of indus-
trial-scale renewable energy generation has come
under increased criticism, laying bare the continued
reliance on extractive operations, green grabbing
(Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones 2012), and resource
use in countries of the Global South, rather than
challenging resource exploitation, (neo)colonial
dependencies, inequalities, and ecological degrada-
tion (e.g., Bonds and Downey 2012; Zehner 2012;
Dunlap 2018a, 2018b, 2019; Sanchez De Jaegher
2018). Such projects constitute, critics claim, a con-
tinuation of old patterns of accumulation and degra-
dation, hiding the true costs of extractivism, while
greenwashing corporate and state involvement in
the accelerating climate crisis and opening new
“green” markets. Dunlap thus coined the term fossil
fuel þ to highlight the continuities with conven-
tional fossil fuel generation and the political–eco-
nomic violence inherent to their operation in the
name of the green economy (Dunlap 2018a; Dunlap
and Brock forthcoming). More often than not, polit-
ical ecology work illustrates that the benefits of such
technologies continue to accrue to global (corporate)
elites, rather than communities near the project
sites, who pay the social and ecological costs for
their development. Granted, in our case, even
though solar industrialization developments were
“cleaner” than previous industrial developments
in the region (e.g., chemicals, coal, or photography),
in the socioeconomic and political–cultural spheres
in particular the boom failed to live up to
its promise.
Case Study Selection and Background:
German Green Industrialization, the Co-
Option of the Energiewende, and the
Move to the “Dirtiest Town of Europe”
Germany has become renowned over the past
twenty years as a country that has made significant
advances in moving toward a so-called low-carbon
economy. This has been attributed to its major
planned transition toward renewables, the
Energiewende (von Hirschhausen et al. 2018). The
Energiewende, initially a grassroots initiative coming
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out of the antinuclear movement,2 was coopted (or
further facilitated, depending on your interpretation)
by the state when it began to affect the monopolistic
German business structures and has now “become
trapped in government regulations tailored to fit the
interests of the big energy suppliers” (Acosta 2018).
It came to encompass energy efficiency, energy secu-
rity, renewables, and nuclear phaseout. Politically,
the Energiewende and its supporting legislation (the
Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, or Renewable Energy
Act) was enabled by the significant influence of the
Green Party, which was important in shaping the
antinuclear and pro-renewables nature of policymak-
ing in Germany from the 1990s onward (Lauber and
Jacobsson 2016).
As a result of the Energiewende policy efforts, and
despite continued reliance on lignite and hard coal,
until 2019 Germany led the world in its total
installed capacity of solar PV panels per capita
(German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and
Energy 2017; “Top Five Countries” 2020). It has the
fourth greatest total capacity of solar PV installed
anywhere in the world, with 49 gigawatts installed
at the end of 2019, providing 8.2 percent of gross
national supply (Fraunhofer 2020; International
Energy Agency 2020). This means that 37 percent
of Europe's solar PV is installed in Germany, fol-
lowed by Italy at 16 percent (International Energy
Agency 2020).
This rapid diffusion of solar energy was achieved
by creating an early domestic market through spe-
cific policy support measures, such as the national
Feed-in Tariff, which guaranteed a fixed power price
for solar power producers for a twenty-year period
(Fraunhofer 2018b). As well as stimulating high lev-
els of solar energy consumption at household and
commercial levels, Germany also attempted to cata-
lyze new domestic “green” industrial sectors, primar-
ily in wind energy and solar PV. It stimulated these
through the provision of investment grants in the
(new) eastern states of Germany and through the
provision of research support (Fraunhofer 2018b). By
2007, Germany was the largest producer of solar
panels globally, and a German company (Q Cells)
led the international rankings in production volume.
The area around the eastern German town of
Bitterfeld–Wolfen, in Saxony, became central to
these efforts, with the area becoming branded as
Solar Valley. Several of the largest firms, including
Q Cells and Solar World, were located in the
region. The sector employed 15,000 people nation-
ally and at least 5,000 full-time, permanent employ-
ees in Solar Valley itself (Fraunhofer 2018a). Q
Cells became the innovator and leader of
the industry.
Bitterfeld has an industrial history that has pro-
foundly shaped the region, socially, culturally, and
geographically. The discovery of lignite coal and the
development of the chemical and film industries in
the nineteenth century led to rapid economic and
population growth. Initially delivering chemicals to
companies in Berlin and West Germany, the area
then became an industrial powerhouse during World
War I. Small and medium-sized companies were
quickly bought up by larger holding companies and
later became East German or Soviet state property
(Freier 1995).
The boom of the coal, chemical, and film indus-
tries came at enormous social and ecological costs,
the extent of which were suppressed by the East
German regime and its security apparatus. In 1988,
an illegally filmed documentary first showed the
degree of industrial pollution in what was widely
regarded as Europe’s most polluted town. It showed
an area devastated by mining, industrial chimneys
emitting exhaust fumes of different colors, degraded
and grimy housing areas, toxic waste dumps, and
heavily polluted rivers and local ecosystems.
Residents and employees reported high levels of ill-
nesses including bronchitis, croup, lung diseases, and
fluoride toxicity. Regular chemical accidents were
hardly reported on, and monitoring and regulation
by the East German government was negligible. In
return for the corporate harm (Benson and Kirsch
2010) caused by industrial production, employees
received slightly above-average wages and subsidized
hard liqueur (Schnaps) during the winter months.
When industries—especially the coal industry—col-
lapsed with the fall of the Berlin Wall, many thou-
sands lost their jobs and the area lost almost half of
its population. As Maron (2009) noted, “Many peo-
ple never recovered from the shock, became
depressed or withdrew in shame, or lost their inner
strength. Others adapted to their new, ‘reduced’
lives” (2, authors’ translation). This is the backdrop
against which the solar industry set up in the area,
and Solar Valley promised regeneration and green
industrial development.
Since its peak in 2008, however, the market share
of German manufacturers has dropped dramatically,
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90 percent of German solar jobs have been lost, and
almost every major solar manufacturer has filed for
bankruptcy (L€utkenhorst and Pegels 2014). Solar
Valley almost disappeared. These events were largely
attributed to the rapidly declining costs of panel pro-
duction and the corresponding investments into
solar production capacity in East Asia, as well as
subsidies from the Chinese government (Meckling
and Hughes 2018). In 2008, “the Chinese govern-
ment began providing large subsidies for solar com-
panies, helping reduce the cost of manufacturing
solar PV panels and increasing China’s solar panel
manufacturing capacity tenfold” (Bell 2017, 554).
The resulting oversupply drove down world market
prices by 75 percent (Haley and Haley, 2013). Once
these economic conditions were in place, the low
complexity associated with PV production made it
easy for production to relocate to countries such as
China and Taiwan (Fraunhofer 2018b). Indeed,
turnkey production lines that produce very good
quality PV modules can now bought off the shelf,
enabling fast technology transfer.
It was not only German solar manufacturing firms
that were unable to compete with falling global
prices. Silicon Valley in the United States, once also
envisaged as “Solar Valley” (Zachary 2008), also
crumbled (Woody 2011). Major manufacturers were
forced to declare bankruptcy and others were bought
up by Chinese firms,3 ending “the ‘renaissance’ of
the US solar industry” (Caprotti 2017, 937).
Meanwhile, increased competition from China led
to lower environmental standards across the indus-
try, as firms with higher standards, such as manda-
tory buyback recycling programs for old solar panels,
were forced to cut costs or went out of business
(Haley and Haley 2013; Harkinson 2013).
As factories started to close and jobs began to be
lost in Germany to overseas manufacturers, the
German government made the decision not to try to
save the German solar manufacturing industry and
actively campaigned for the European Commission
not to take action against (illegal) Chinese subsidies,
according to interviewees, and to allow the import
of cheap (subsidized) panels (Clean Energy Wire
2018). This judgment was ostensibly based on the
idea that where low-carbon technologies were made
was not important; thus, if China could make the
panels more cheaply, then it made sense for
Germany to specialize elsewhere and to import pan-
els from China. Others have argued, however, that
the German government shifted from supporting
solar to supporting offshore wind and biogas under
lobbying pressure from the “Big 4” energy companies
because these large-scale investments were better
suited to their business models (Kuzemko
et al. 2017).
Although the experiences in Germany over the
past decade are often rationalized as inevitable con-
sequences of globalized economic competition (and
were framed this way by some local residents inter-
viewed), there are unappreciated socioeconomic
impacts of the rise and sudden fall of the solar
manufacturing sector for already peripheral regions
such as Bitterfeld. Thus, this study aims to explore
these impacts through the lens of Solar Valley in
eastern Germany.
Research Methods: Reviews, Interviews,
and Site Visits
To investigate the political ecology of solar energy
in the region, we first reviewed archival and com-
mentary material; second, we conducted semistruc-
tured interviews with German experts; third, we
interviewed community members in Bitterfeld–
Wolfen and surrounding areas; and fourth, we
carried out site visits in the Solar Valley region
(summarized in Table 1).
Archival material was collected from Internet
searches in English and German; from key academic
databases, such as Web of Knowledge and Scopus;
from the gray literature; and from online newspa-
per archives.
Seven expert interviewees were identified through
snowball sampling. An initial list of key players in
Solar Valley was constructed through Internet
searches and the utilization of prior contacts in
Germany, and subsequent relevant persons were dis-
covered locally throughout the interview process
itself. During each interview, we asked the following
standard questions: How did the solar manufacturing
experience affect the local community in Bitterfeld–
Wolfen? Who benefited? Who or what was most
affected by the collapse of the sector? Each interview
lasted generally between 45 and 120minutes, and
respondents were guaranteed full anonymity to
encourage candor and protect respondents from
potential retaliation. Each participant was given a
unique respondent number (e.g., GERE1).
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Given the research questions focused partly on
community perceptions and impacts, expert inter-
views were complemented with interviews with com-
munity members in the Solar Valley region. These
included persons who had worked in the solar
manufacturing sector and those who had been
directly or indirectly affected by its collapse. In total,
seven community interviews were conducted, follow-
ing the same script as the expert interviews. Each
respondent was guaranteed anonymity and was also
assigned a unique respondent number (e.g., GERC1).
Finally, to complement the interviews, we con-
ducted eight site visits for naturalistic observation—
encompassing three trips to Solar Valley itself, visits
to the surrounding towns that benefited from invest-
ment and tax revenues, and visits to an industrial
history museum. Each of these naturalistic site visits
lasted between 20 and 180minutes.
Results: Industrial Strategy,
Dispossession, and Sacrifice in German
Solar Energy
Our results emphasize how solar energy first
emerged as a core component of German industrial
strategy, one intended to (perhaps ironically) pro-
mote domestic and local investment as well as
provide jobs. This industrial revitalization was short-
lived, however, leading to collapse and eventual
processes of disappointment, peripheralization,
and sacrifice.
The Emergence of German Solar
Industrial Strategy
According to key actors close to the policy pro-
cess, the rush of investment into solar manufacturing
in Bitterfeld–Wolfen in the early 2000s was facili-
tated by local government actors, who facilitated tax
breaks and other financial incentives for interested
companies, all against the backdrop of German
industrial strategy (Pakiam, 2011). Other conditions
also made the specific area attractive for solar invest-
ment, however, including very cheap land values;
tax concessions from municipalities; the area’s preex-
isting human resource and technical capacities in
chemical and sealing industries, as well as, impor-
tantly, workers’ willingness to do shift work and
commute long distances (to which we return later);
and the openness among municipalities to brokering
concessionary arrangements on cost-sharing agree-
ments around the setup of new industrial parks. As
GERE2 explained:
The experience was a very brief but large bubble
within the longer history of industrial production in
the region. PV was for a time seen as the “savior” for
the region. Solar developed in Germany because of
well-educated workforce and infrastructure, supported
with the major marketing angle of overseas firms is
that the tech is still “engineering in Germany.” It was
seen as fitting for the Bitterfeld region due to its
experience of coating within the photography and
chemical industry. … Subsidies were given to firms on
land prices and they were essentially the reason for the
companies to come, along with the improved








Expert research interviews February and March 2019 GERE1–7 Research institutes, private
solar firms, mayors’
offices, unions
Community research interviews February and March 2019 GERC1–7 Solar workers, local newspaper
journalist,
community members
Site visits and naturalistic
observation








Note: GERE¼German expert interviews; GERC¼German community interviews.
10 Brock, Sovacool, and Hook
infrastructure and convenient location close to Berlin
and Leipzig. Also because the region has lower wages
and expectations than the Berlin area, and it had a
long history of industrial expertise to draw from
spanning 125 years.
As they concluded, “People are always waiting for a
job” in this region, making it an attractive anchor
for solar investment and an ideal location for solar
manufacturing.
GERE4 noted that at the height of this boom,
things were looking good for Bitterfeld–Wolfen and
the broader solar energy sector:
The fact that a young industry located its headquarters in
the region was an added bonus, as this had added
advantages for workers, who could buy shares in the
firms, and local economy and politics, which had more
direct influence and financial benefit. The first workers
and investors became very rich because of the rises in
share prices. At that time, Q Cells stood for innovation
in the beginning and a new kind of tech for the region.
It was recognized that the “already-settled” chemical
industry could provide a good base of knowledge and
infrastructure. The factory and industrial installations in
Solar Valley were brand new and high tech, and the
Solar Valley brand was attractive for new firms. The
tristate Solar Valley Mitteldeutsch cluster attracted a lot
of federal funds and worked to develop interfirm
knowledge and production sharing.
Solar energy offered, in the words of other respondents,
a potential manufacturing or industrial “renaissance”
and “revitalization” of the entire region. GERC2 com-
mented that because the “industry is young, it didn’t
have tradition.” Although this would ultimately mean
that there was less political will to save it when com-
petition from China emerged, it initially meant that
the solar energy sector was able to cultivate itself as
new and modern. As GERC2 continued, the industry
ultimately consisted “of a number of newly built facto-
ries on the green meadow. At the beginning, when
the industry was new, everyone wanted to invest.
There was some envy, too.” GERC4 added, “What is
remarkable is how fast the solar companies grew, and
from how far many commuted to get to work. From
Dresden, Leipzig, Berlin.”
At its peak, the sector provided 5,000 to 6,000 jobs
locally directly in solar and a further 15,000 indirectly
in supporting sectors. It also brought tax revenues for
local municipalities, facilitating community funds for
new infrastructure, sports clubs, kindergartens, and pub-
lic transport. It cemented partnerships between solar
firms and local businesses and led, for example, to spon-
sorship deals between local sports clubs and solar firms,
such as Q Cells (e.g., Figure 2). Although the disaggre-
gated local data on financial benefits to Bitterfeld–
Wolfen are not available, they are likely to have been
at least a third of national financial benefits of the solar
manufacturing sector, which stood at 3 billion euros in
tax revenue and 5 billion euros in income directly to
employees (BSW-Solar Pressestelle 2009).
Perhaps most significant, however, was the way in
which the arrival of the solar sector represented a psy-
chological boost for the region itself, which had lived
in the shadow of its wealthier western German coun-
terparts ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
demise of the coal industry had led to an exodus of
the population. The arrival of the solar industry was
thus an opportunity for the eastern German region to
get ahead in a “global industry of the future” (see
Figure 3). As a local politician (GERE7) explained:
Everyone had high hopes that this would become an
amazing story. There was never-ending euphoria, and
the hope of well-paid jobs. Many who worked in other
local industries quit their jobs and swapped over.
Not since the great photography companies such as
Agfa had made Wolfen—now part of Bitterfeld–
Wolfen—their home had the region been an indus-
trial pioneer in this same sense. This alluring narra-
tive continued to inform the city’s marketing, trying
to capitalize on the green credentials of the solar
industry to attract tourist development and selling
the city as Gr€une Industriestadt am See (green indus-
trial city on the shores of a lake).
The Collapse of Solar Energy Manufacturing
Such optimism, however, was short-lived. As
explained previously, the solar energy sector began
to falter in 2008, before completely collapsing, at
least in Bitterfeld–Wolfen, shortly after (Vasagar
2013). As GERC2 explained:
It was all about international competition. The
Chinese market surprised us, with lower labor costs
and state subsidies. German producers had no chance.
China wanted to be world leader.
Shares in German solar firms plummeted, companies
went bankrupt, and more than $20 billion in market
value was lost, in what Vasagar (2013, 2) called an
industry “meltdown” and a “rare disaster story for
German manufacturing.” As GERE1 explained:
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Such a capital-intensive industry with low long-term
returns could not have survived in the context of
overseas manufacturing price declines in East Asia.
The worst impacts on the region were caused by
overproduction prior to the financial crisis, after which
further loans were not forthcoming. The losers here
were the firms who had large debts and had to let
hundreds of people go.
The fall of the solar sector thus had several key
impacts. Thousands of full-time jobs in solar
manufacturing were lost in the Solar Valley. Many
of the people who lost their jobs at higher (manage-
rial) levels were more mobile and so could move
elsewhere in Germany to find work. A few were able
to remain in the small number of solar research and
development positions that remained in Germany,
because the largely East Asian companies that
bought out the German firms found the “Engineered
in Germany” tag to be a strong branding pull. Lower
skilled workers (who had been trained in the sector
and were not unionized), however, had to seek new
jobs—within the region’s chemical parks or the
newly opened Porsche and BMW factories near
Leipzig, for example—or else they remained unem-
ployed. GERC2 explained:
Even while it was collapsing, working conditions were
good. But there was no labor agreement/union rate.
Workers were not unionized. It was difficult for us to
work with them. With bankruptcy it was very difficult.
The labor market could not absorb the surplus labor
immediately. We negotiated with them. There was a
“transitional company” [Transfergesellschaft] that
ensured that workers continued to get paid. Many
worked reduced hours. Many ended up unemployed.
The municipalities also lost out in several ways.
They missed the high tax revenues they had come
to rely on for several years, with many of the ameni-
ties that had been sustained by solar wealth now
lying dormant. As GERE5 explained:
A disadvantage for the community was that, as they
were stakeholders in the businesses in Solar Valley and
were co-owners of the water/security/road/waste water/
street lamps/road gritting infrastructure (e.g., Thalheim
village [part of Bitterfeld–Wolfen]), they not only lost
revenues on lost profits that they had been enjoying,
Figure 2. A sports club funded by Q Cells in Thalheim, complete with solar panels and floodlighting.
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but also had to bear some costs of site
decommissioning, for example, paying for security
systems to be deinstalled.
Figure 4 shows a multi-million-dollar abandoned fac-
tory at Bitterfeld–Wolfen's Sun Park. Furthermore,
some municipalities that had entered into cost-shar-
ing arrangements with private solar companies on
industrial parks were left with debts to pay and no
private-sector counterpart to share the costs.
Disappointment, Peripheralization, Resignation,
and Acceptable Sacrifice
The sudden collapse of German solar manufactur-
ing resulted in understandable disappointment, lead-
ing to longer lasting dispossession and further
solidifying the region as a sacrifice zone for high-
and low-carbon development. Following decades of
stagnation, high unemployment rates, and political
marginalization, the solar industry offered a chance
to overcome the legacy of deindustrialization and a
promise to catch up with West German develop-
ment. This was particularly evident at the time of Q
Cell’s stock market launch, which triggered political
excitement and pride in the area. As
GERE5 explained:
The big disappointment for the region was that it was
seen as a chance for the East to catch up with the
West and to excel in something new and futuristic.
Thus, the collapse and the loss of really high-quality
jobs was a major psychological blow to the region. It
was a community, a family; people who worked in the
Solar Valley were proud of their jobs and there was a
deep sadness about this breaking down. Everything was
moving very fast and then suddenly … the catching
up was over.
The emotional loss of the sector and the disappoint-
ment associated with high expectations turning to
failure was significant. Indeed, the psychological
impacts of the bankruptcies, and fears of a second
deindustrialization in a region that was still suffering
from the catastrophic declines of industry following
the fall of the Berlin Wall in the early 1990s, might
have been more salient than the job losses. These
psychological impacts must be understood in the
context of the depression and political resignation
that were caused by decades of exploitation and feel-
ings of acting as a “sacrifice zone,” as one respondent
put it, for the industrial development of East
Germany. In those days, when the Bitterfeld region
was mining lignite to generate energy for Germany,
“Berlin got the electricity, we got the ashes,” they
noted. This shows how economic marginalization
Figure 3. The high-tech industrial facilities at Solar Valley, with a solar farm in the foreground.
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and peripheralization was exacerbated by political
and symbolic marginalization and peripheralization
(McQuarrie 2017; see also Cramer 2016; Hochschild
2018), which went beyond the material effects of
the double process of deindustrialization.
In her novel about Bitterfeld, published after a
newspaper report that she had written about the
town was censored by the ruling East German
Communist Party, Maron (1981) wrote:
The people of B[itterfeld] have adapted, they have got
used to being residents of B[itterfeld] and to get
covered with dirt. It may just be harsh and heartless to
tell them: You have been forgotten, sacrificed for
something more important. And I cannot change that.
(45, authors’ translation)
Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, people were
then left to deal with the consequences of deindus-
trialization and unemployment and to catch up with
capitalist (hyper)development, causing resignation
and widespread depression. The fall of solar thus
constituted the second crisis in many people’s
lifetimes and meant, a local politician (GERE7)
explained, that “many families were hit twice.”
This second time around, the decline further
entrenched the peripheralization of German house-
holds and communities. First, compared with the
photography and coal industries, which were well
unionized and much more embedded culturally and
politically in the region, the lack of unionization
and protection around the solar jobs—following
years of neoliberal social reforms and increasing pre-
carity and austerity caused by national government
decisions—meant that there was little political activ-
ism around saving the jobs. As a local journalist
(GERC6) summarized:
There was never a big outcry, a big scream when the
solar industry fell, compared to the decline of the coal
industry. It was noted, reported, but not that it was a
huge catastrophe. There was creeping resignation.
Yet, many local people never shared the high
expectations and the political enthusiasm in the first
place and greeted the loss of solar with the attitude
Figure 4. An abandoned solar manufacturing factory at Solar Valley.
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that the solar experience had been a kind of “blip”
or “bubble” that “no one had expected to
last” (GERC5).
Finally, a strong notion emerged from our data
that Bitterfeld was both a preventable but also
acceptable sacrifice on the long and bumpy road
toward solar manufacturing globally. GERE1
stated plainly:
The government had the chance to save the industry,
but the ideology of free markets said that the sector
had to fail. So they also eventually removed anti-
dumping measures—which actually had the effect of
temporally slowing down the energy transition
in Germany.
GERE2 agreed and noted:
I do not believe anything could have been done
differently to save the solar industry because there was
no way of competing with China, and free markets
need to be the deciders of where industrial production
takes place. Wealth is created through free markets.
We need to let those free markets function. Solar was
the first time that Bitterfeld had had to compete with
the world. Bitterfeld lost.
GERE4 remarked:
Regional politicians could not do anything because
these were bigger questions of globalization. … The
government could have tried to give subsidies to the
industry as it does with other sectors, such as the
automobile industry, but it didn’t want to.
GERC3 agreed and noted:
They [politicians] could have done something—they
could have implemented subsidies or tariffs, as part of
the German not-so-social market economy, but they
didn’t want to interfere with the market, they were
following free market ideology.
This relative lack of interventionism is particularly
noteworthy given current contestation and activism
to “save” the ecologically disastrous lignite coal
industry in eastern and western Germany, where cor-
porate and state actors collaborate closely to position
coal as integral to national interest, as “green” and
sustainable, and as indispensable for energy security
(Brock and Dunlap 2018; Brock 2019, 2020b).
Unlike the solar industry, the coal industry is histori-
cally highly unionized, tied into regional and
national policymaking, and—also thanks to trade
union and climate justice activism—highly present in
nationwide media coverage (Brock and Dunlap 2018;
Brock 2019, 2020b). Unlike solar manufacturing in
Bitterfeld, coal policy is “high politics” and the cul-
tural and political embeddedness of the sector in
German society is far deeper. Coal phaseout thus
comes with enormous compensation payments to the
industry and promises of just transitions and new
(green) jobs.
Others put the collapse of Bitterfeld in context by
justifying it on the grounds that it still led to
cheaply produced solar energy. GERE3 argued, for
example, that for them, the lesson of Bitterfeld
is this:
Broadly it really doesn’t matter where the semi-
conductors and panels are made, what’s more
important is producing energy. … It’s not the end of
the world if that part of the value creation is based in
Germany or not. … At the time, everyone said we
should try and compete with China on price, but it’s
not a fight we could have ever won … now
everything is done cheaply, cheaply, cheaply.
Implicit in this statement is that making solar energy
more affordable for everyone is an acceptable conse-
quence at any social or ecological price, even if it
meant the Bitterfeld region had to suffer. The car-
bon reduction imperative is thus far removed from
questions of local development, decision making,
and power. This illustrates the green capitalist logic
that underlies the large-scale rollout of “green”
energy without consideration of the need to tackle
the systemic problems, inequalities, and injustices
associated with the political economy of energy.
Today’s political situation, of course—the lack of
social and cultural infrastructure and high support
for the AFD—is not reducible to the consequence of
the collapse of the short-lived Solar Valley dream
but the outcome of a longer industrial history of
green and nongreen industrial development, political
marginalization, dispossession, and alienation.
Although the local economy has recovered and
unemployment rates have decreased, young people
continue to leave the area for lack of cultural and
recreational opportunities. As our field research
revealed, parts of the city resemble a ghost town,
with empty houses and barricaded widows, sur-
rounded by large solar fields (and wind parks) that
serve as a reminder of their failed hopes (Figure 5).
The city is empty and sparking clean—no graffiti on
many of the abandoned buildings, no noisy pubs or
local youth hangouts. Many of the enormous East
German–style apartment blocks have been torn
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down, and others are slowly aging, with an age aver-
age of almost eighty years, a local mayor reported.
The resigned acceptance of these processes of
marginalization and dispossession is closely linked to
the effects of globalization, trade liberalization, and
their unequal effects across space and time. They
encapsulate what Fisher (2009) has termed
“capitalist realism,” or “the widespread sense that
not only is capitalism the only viable political and
economic system, but also that it is now impossible
even to imagine a coherent alternative to it” (2).
Such thinking entrenches belief in the inevitability
of suffering in the name of “progress,” the need of
sacrifice, resembling an almost postpolitical attitude
where nothing can be done. Fisher (2009) called
this a “pervasive atmosphere that affects people’s
thoughts,” and a “kind of invisible barrier constrain-
ing thought and action” (16).
The sacrificing of Bitterfeld–Wolfen is the prod-
uct of politics and a cause of populism: of increas-
ingly precarious employment, flexibilization of work
patterns and shift work, eroding class solidarity
through weakening of trade unions, and the perva-
sive messaging from the political establishment as
well as the mainstream media: “There Is No
Alternative” (Fisher 2009). The effects are depoliti-
cizing and individualizing. Those losing their solar
jobs received only marginal skills training and con-
sultations with the unemployment center and health
care for resulting anxieties and depression. Class
struggle and solidarity, once an important part of the
social fabric in Bitterfeld, have disappeared, allowing
room for anti-migrant populism.
Political resignation is being harvested by extreme
right-wing, allegedly anti-establishment political parties
that promise an alternative: One in three voters in
Bitterfeld–Wolfen voted for the far-right, openly racist,
xenophobic, and Islamophobic Alternative for Germany
in the 2016 election. The party’s recent success is
grounded in the consequences or failure of moderniza-
tion, including deindustrialization and prevarication
under neoliberalism and unjust and unequal center–-
periphery relationships (Priester 2019). AFD politicians
capitalize on people feeling “left behind,” having “lost
control,” and being not just economically but culturally
neglected (Priester 2019). The lack of social, material,
and cultural infrastructure in Bitterfeld only speaks to
this neglect.
Yet, the city was once a center of working-class
organization—part of the “red heart of central
Figure 5. The clean but largely quiet and empty city of Bitterfeld, Germany.
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Germany” (L€ohn 2011, 313), heartland of the social
democrats and the Communist Party of Germany,
and repeatedly home to strikes and labor struggles. It
was central to the East German uprising of 1953
(Schr€oter 2016), when workers took over Bitterfeld
governmental and police structures, releasing politi-
cal prisoners and almost toppling the regime, until
they were defeated by Soviet tanks (L€ohn 2011).
Today, many are scared of globalization and “free
trade” (Lobenstein 2017), disillusioned by rising
inequalities and lack of opportunities. Having wit-
nessed strong government and regional support for
the solar industry—subsidies for solar manufacturers,
low tax rates, a new Autobahn slip road, in addition
to subsidies for solar installations on the national
level—many perceive governmental action to priori-
tize corporate over human well-being
(Lobenstein 2017).
The ongoing depression and cynicism, we suggest,
are fed by “discontent about the present and the per-
ceived inability to change the future” (Benson and
Kirsch 2010, 459). Or, as Fischer (2009) compel-
lingly wrote:
The hegemonic field which capitalist realism secures
and intensifies is one in which politics itself has been
“disappeared.” … Capitalist realism doesn’t appear in
the first instance, then, as a political position. It
emerges instead as a pragmatic adjustment—“this is the
way thing are now.” This sense of resignation, of
fatalism, is crucial to the “realism.” … Capitalist
realism isn’t the direct endorsement of neoliberal
doctrine; it’s the idea that, whether we like it or not,
the world is governed by neoliberal ideas, and that
won’t change. There’s no point fighting the
inevitable. (90)
This is particularly interesting given Bitterfeld’s loca-
tion in the former East Germany. Fisher’s concept of
the postpolitical was developed in response to the
alleged “end of history” with the fall of the Soviet
Union and the Berlin Wall. Despite some nostalgia,
few reminisce about East German times in
Bitterfeld—yet, there seems to be little imagination
for political alternatives. The resulting crisis of imag-
ination (Fisher 2009) is worse, arguably, than the
material consequences of deindustrialization. The
neoliberal subject, of course, is meant to be a con-
sumer above all, in a system that alienates and indi-
vidualizes and where consumer choice seems to be
the most political act possible.
The resulting resignation, or fatalism, is a hall-
mark of Blowers’s (1999) peripheralization thesis,
according to which peripheral communities resign
themselves to hardship and internalize the idea that
they should be “grateful” for any benefits that come
their way. As Blowers (1999) stated, however, subse-
quent boom and bust cycles can further heighten the
preexisting vulnerabilities that remain from earlier
experiences of hardship. It also shows how spatial
inequalities can manifest themselves alongside social
and economic inequalities that further propel
“capitalist realism” and “politics of resignation”
within these communities.
Conclusion
The rise and fall of the solar manufacturing sector
in the Bitterfeld region offers insights into the ways
in which the whims of global “green” capital can
create vulnerabilities and exacerbate inequalities,
even in wealthy countries such as Germany
(Bickerstaff, Walker, and Bulkeley 2013). In this
case, the collapse of Solar Valley offers additional
insights into experiences of dispossession and the
processes through which peripheralization can be
reinforced by even well-meaning attempts to revital-
ize regions and communities—double marginalized
by its geographic location in the eastern part of the
country. It also shows how in particular contexts,
social, economic, and political aspects of peripherali-
zation and sacrifice can be stronger drivers than
environmental factors. Finally, it demonstrates that
spatial justice (and injustice) can manifest itself not
only through cities and spatial structures but also
across the very sociotechnical systems society
urgently needs to adopt to decarbonize. Given the
sobering connections we find between populism,
economic decline, and environmental degradation,
failing to attend to the spatial justice implications of
renewable energy life cycles also risks intensifying or
emboldening a globally resurgent right.
This article has shown that “green” industrial
development is by no means automatically social
and just—or sustainable, for that matter. Although
ecological pollution of solar production continues to
be outsourced to the Global South, the social costs
become visible even in those countries that have
historically profited most from climate crisis, as well
as from contemporary energy transitions to mitigate
climate change. In our case specifically, the social
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costs of green deindustrialization are grave in a
country known for its “greenness,” Germany, which
is often used as an example that other countries
around the world should follow. Within the longer
industrial history of the Bitterfeld region, the col-
lapse of solar is clearly dwarfed in its significance by
the decline of the photographic industry after more
than eighty years, the demise of the coal industry
after more than 100 years, and the fall of the Berlin
Wall, the legacies of which continue to define the
struggles in the region to the present day. Locally,
people are therefore resigned about the loss of the
solar sector, an attitude that is further comprehensi-
ble in the context of the now internalized logic of a
contemporary global political economy—that “all
that is solid melts to air” (Berman 1983).
Indeed, the current collapse of the wind energy
industry in Germany suggests that no sector is safe
from the forces of global competition (Bloomberg
2018) but that these forces are also the product of poli-
tics. It also implies that future sacrifice zones might be
inevitable, as long as new manufacturing sectors
emerge (in East Asia or elsewhere) to undercut
manufacturing or labor costs or the renewable energy
sector remains committed to what respondents termed
“free market ideology” and an obsession over making
clean energy “cheaply, cheaply, cheaply.” This commit-
ment to markets and obsession with low cost all but
guarantee that future peripheralization, given the
mobility of capital and labor, unanchored to location,
will continually search for profit margins and innova-
tion at the expense of local communities. It lays bare
the false promises of green industrialization and
ecomodernism, feeding into the rise of populist right-
wing parties such as the AFD. “That such an experi-
ence should stir populist anger should surprise no one”
(Knuth 2019, 640). Yet, our conclusions here are ten-
tative—the link between the lived experiences of
(green) deindustrialization and resignation and the rise
of populism and the turn to the right urgently require
further investigation.
This article points to the spatial justice implica-
tions of green (de)industrialization and their links
through social erosion, lived experiences of margin-
alization, and resignation—the localized effects of
globalized supply chains and markets. In fact, the
demise of solar manufacturing in Germany went
hand in hand with the creation of new and much
more destructive sacrifice zones in China, with
Harkinson (2013) showing that many solar panel
manufacturers are now refusing to provide any infor-
mation about their manufacturing practices at all,
and others are cutting back on recycling programs
and environmental commitments. In the German
context, this has made the benefits afforded by solar
energy manufacturing impermanent and inseparable
from the more descriptive forces of capitalism.
The solar manufacturing industry needs to operate
at a large scale to take advantage of economies of
scale, interviewees explained, thus undermining
attempts to decentralize and democratize energy pro-
vision. As both the rise and decline of German solar
manufacturing but also the German Energiewende
have shown, they do nothing to disrupt the global
political economy and the power relations and
inequalities—in Germany and in the world—that
industrial-scale renewable energy systems are embed-
ded in, and that need to be challenged as part of
any more transformative and longer lasting “green”
transition. The Energiewende has gone hand in hand
with the continued reliance on lignite coal (the
world’s dirtiest energy source), investments in oil
and gas (domestic and abroad), and political support
for many other ecologically destructive industries.
However “green,” capitalism continues to follow the
logic of growth, competitiveness, and exploitation of
natural and human resources at huge social and ecolog-
ical costs. Although the Energiewende fosters a sense of
cleanliness, greenness, and purity around German
energy corporations and signals optimism about the
green credentials of the German government, it also
further obstructs meaningful attempts to build up local
and community-owned and -operated energy systems.
The German solar sector conservatively reinforces an
inherently unequal global and national political econ-
omy, rather than fostering a radically restructured
economy that runs on principles of solidarity and sus-
tainability, not profit. Radical democratization and
decentralization, the mandatory use of recycled materi-
als, while curbing the power of corporations involved
in the political economy of energy, with a strict (and
strictly enforced) ban of all trade of electronic and
other toxic waste together with fundamentally
reformed regulations on trade of energy manufacturing
resources prioritizing ecological and social justice con-
cerns, might be a start.
The movement of capital, however contradictory
and contested it is, leaves material and psychological
scars for communities, as this case study on
Bitterfeld has shown. Against all this uncertainty, at
18 Brock, Sovacool, and Hook
least one thing remains certain. For Bitterfeld at
least, and as GERE2 put it blithely, “the new hori-
zon of solar energy has disappeared.” Moreover, as a
local journalist (GERC4) concluded, although peo-
ple in the Bitterfeld region “believe that another
opportunity will come … they may be wary of the
risks of the renewable sector in the future.” Thus,
these negative experiences could influence more
broadly people’s perceptions about the potential risks
and vulnerabilities of low-carbon transitions, ques-
tions about the ecological and social costs, and ques-
tions about for whom they are just and equitable.
Whether such perceptions will affect Germany’s
Energiewende or push investment in solar energy to
be more just and equitable worldwide remains to
be seen.
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Notes
1. The town of Bitterfeld–Wolfen was formed in 2007
through the merger of formerly independent towns
of Bitterfeld and Wolfen, as well as the
municipalities of Greppin, Holzweißig,
and Thalheim.
2. Antinuclear movements spread in Germany in the
1970s with local citizen initiatives organizing
protests, demonstrations, rallies, and legal challenges
against plans to build nuclear power stations. In
1975, 28,000 protesters occupied (and later
reoccupied) the construction site of a nuclear power
plant in Wyhl in the south of the country, leading
the local government and administrative court to
stop construction.
3. Of the three major solar players in 2010—Solyndra,
Nanosolar, and MiaSole (Woody 2010)—two are
now bankrupt, and MiaSole was acquired by the
Chinese company Hanergy in 2013. For an analysis
of the rise and fall of Solyndra, the “central actor
within the ‘green’ niche around renewable energy in
the US in the late 2000s” and recipient of major
government loans, see Caprotti (2017, 938).
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